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Europe's Unity in European Values
Alongside the debate about the European Union constitution, a debate about European values has also developed. This debate is important not only for implanting meaning in the constitution, but will also determine the vitality and energy of the EU itself.
The EU, being the product of several great religious and philosophical traditions, is a community of values. The ideas of the Greeks and Romans, Christianity, Judaism, humanism and the Enlightenment have made us who we are. Dialogue with Islamic and Arabic cultures also helped form our identity. The pattern of our values has been woven over hundreds of years.
Europe is the continent of Michelangelo and Montesquieu, but also of the guillotine and the gas chamber. Indeed, the bitter experience World War II taught Europeans how fundamental is the importance of shared values. In an impoverished, war-ravaged Europe, people yearned for peace, freedom, stability and a new chance to prosper.
The architects of European integration--Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi and others--understood that these ideals could be achieved only by combining and interweaving the practical interests of Europe's countries. They built their fragile house of peace on a foundation of coal and steel.
The founders passed the torch on to the generation of Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl, Franaois Mitterrand, VÝclav Havel, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and others. They broadened and deepened European cooperation. Their leadership made it possible for Europe to make great strides towards its post-war ideals--peace, stability and prosperity.
We now stand at the threshold of a new phase of European cooperation. In late October, the EU's Constitutional Treaty will be signed. A new generation of politicians is ready to carry the torch onwards.
But is the torch still burning bright? In the early 1950s, Jean Monnet wrote: "We are not forming a coalition of states. We are uniting people."
Apparently not. As the union races ahead, it seems that it has lost Europe's citizens along the way. Many are turning their backs on the whole project. They have trouble seeing what is common to Europe. They do not feel part of the great whole. Even in the new member states, enthusiasm for the European family of democracies is cooling. We have achieved a united Europe without uniting Europeans.
Today's post-war generations, lacking direct memory of World War II, view Europe's great achievements--liberty, peace and prosperity--as a given. The idea of Europe as a heritage and a mission does not mean much. But, without ideals, Europe's foundations will erode.
The emphasis on pure self-interest increases this threat. My generation grew up with the image of Europe as an economic form of cooperation. Political motives behind European integration were overshadowed by the economic project. The result is an impression of Europe as a marketplace. A Europe of markets and money, not of man and morals, dominated the project. But without a moral foundation, there can be no free-market economy.
The preamble of the constitution states that Europe is "united in its diversity". This may be the most concise statement of what makes Europe Europe. But the words "united in diversity" raise the question of where this unity lies.
The answer lies in the values on which the union is based. They are contained in three concepts: freedom, solidarity and mutual respect.
Jan Peter Balkenende is prime minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and president of the European Council
JORDANTIMES.COM
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Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda
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A Sudanese girl carries her younger sister inside a refugee camp close to the border with Chad. (AFP File Photo)
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Each day the world is confronted by new reports of atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan. President Bush, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly last month, referred to the situation as "genocide," and he and Secretary General Kofi Annan pledged support for sanctions against the Sudanese government and a Security Council resolution to expand the African Union force on the ground there. But I am afraid that moral condemnation, trade penalties and military efforts by African countries are simply not going to be enough to stop the killing--not nearly enough.
I know, because I've seen it all happen before. A decade ago, I was the Canadian general in command of the United Nations forces in Rwanda when that civil war began and quickly turned into genocide. The conflict was often portrayed as nothing more than an age-old feud between African tribes, a situation that the Western world could do little to stop. All that was left to do was wait to pick up the pieces when the killing stopped and to provide support to rebuild the country.
Although the early stages of the Darfur situation received more news coverage than the Rwanda genocide did, at some level the Western governments are still approaching it with the same lack of priority. In the end, it receives the same intuitive reaction: "What's in it for us? Is it in our 'national' interest?"
Sudan, an underdeveloped, orphan nation, with no links to colonial masters of its past, is essentially being left to its own devices. The Islamic Janjaweed militias of Darfur, with the complicit approval of the government, are bent on ridding the region of its residents, primarily black Africans--killing, raping and driving refugees into camps along the border with Chad.
The United Nations, emasculated by the self-interested maneuverings of the five permanent members of the Security Council, fails to intervene. Its only concrete step, the Security Council resolution passed in July, all but plagiarized the resolutions on Rwanda 10 years earlier. When I read phrases like "reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and independence of Sudan" and "expressing its determination to do everything possible to halt a humanitarian catastrophe, including by taking further action if required," I can't help but think of the stifling directives that were imposed on the United Nations' department of peacekeeping operations in 1994 and then passed down to me in the field.
I recall all too well the West's indifference to the horrors that unfolded in Rwanda beginning in April 1994. Early warnings had gone unheeded, intervention was ruled out and even as the bodies piled up on the streets of Kigali and across the countryside, world leaders quibbled over the definition of what was really happening.
Sudan is a huge country with a harsh terrain and a population unlikely to welcome outside intervention. Still, I believe that a mixture of mobile African Union troops supported by NATO soldiers equipped with helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, night-vision devices and long-range special forces could protect Darfur's displaced people in their camps and remaining villages, and eliminate or incarcerate the Janjaweed.
RomŽo Dallaire is the author of "Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda"
NYTIMES.COM
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Sarkozy Closing In
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Nicolas Sarkozy
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Has French President Jacques Chirac sufficiently weighed the possible effects of his decision to hold a referendum next year on the draft EU constitution, which was approved last June by the European Council?
The rationale for Chirac's move was clear: Betting on a victory of the yes vote, as then forecast by opinion polls, he hoped the referendum would appear as a personal success. He also planned it as a form of revenge on his adversaries, including the Socialist Party, which won last spring's regional and European elections, and his economy and finance minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, who is France's most popular politician thanks to his achievements as home minister.
Sarkozy has all but declared his candidacy for the 2007 presidential election. Chirac will be 75 by then, a bit old, one might say, to run for a new five-year term. But he's an active and dynamic man who never tires of meeting people or participating in the great global strategic game. It's hard to imagine him as a peaceful retiree, deprived of all his highly treasured powers and perks. Moreover, once his time in office has ended and his judicial immunity is gone, he may have to explain some campaign-financing irregularities in court.
Chirac has been at pains not to speak of his candidacy. But he has been equally at pains to find a way to discourage Sarkozy from running. So far his efforts have failed.
Chirac's traditional national TV interview on July 14 provided him an opportunity to counter his rival. "I give the orders, and he executes," he said bluntly. Sarkozy kept his mouth shut at the time, but another judicial affair provided him an opportunity to show he enjoys wide support in the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), which is supposed to be the president's party.
Having received a suspended jail sentence for illegally hiring UMP allies in Paris when it was a stronghold of the right, former Prime Minister Alain Juppe resigned from the party's chairmanship. Sarkozy took this as an opportunity to hint that he could run for the now-vacant position. Chirac, not bothering to mask his displeasure, declared that one can't be chairman of the party and a member of the government at the same time.
Sarkozy, however, will run. If elected in December as expected, he has indicated he will give up his ministerial portfolio once Parliament has passed the budget. Chirac will then be forced for more than two years to work closely with a man whose avowed ambition is to succeed him.
JAPANTIMES.CO.JP
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Jiang and Hu
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Jiang Zemin
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Last month, former president and chairman of the communist party Jiang Zemin (78) decided to stand down as army chief in favour of Hu Jintao (61), the country's current president and head of the ruling party.
When Hu replaced Jiang as party leader in late 2003 and as president early this year, but without controlling the gun, many analysts viewed the change as very awkward and held that he could not freely work. But now he is the undisputed top leader, commanding the state, the ruling party, and the 2.8 million People's Liberation Army.
One, of course, cannot expect radical changes towards a real democratic system, especially if Jiang's resignation is not a genuine move.
But Hu may be now in a better position to carry out his agenda of improving party governance by increasing its transparency and accountability, to crackdown on corruption that is destroying the party from within, and to deal more decisively with the country's numerous challenges such as the gap between rich and poor, rural poverty, enormous migration from countryside to cities, and over-heated economy.
Hu may also be now less tied in approaching hot issues like Taiwan and Hong Kong.
On the Hong Kong issue too there is speculation that Hu is now in a position to reach a compromise with the island's pro-democracy groups.
In fact, Hu and Prime Minister Wen have appeared in recent years as if they were sympathetic towards pro-democracy sentiment in Hong Kong.
Contrary to these optimistic views, a number of observers do not expect any significant change, arguing that Jiang and Hu are not known to have had any major policy disagreements.
Some of them believe that, unlike in the Mao era and Deng's years, domestic and external decisions are now taken collectively by a number of leaders-- many of whom are loyal to Jiang's legacy--and, therefore, no single man can influence or overturn such decisions. Moreover, they are pessimistic because of Hu's controversial record in Tibet.
Serving there as party secretary between 1988 and 1992, he brutally dealt with Tibetan dissidents. This, however, must not portray him as being inflexible for he was not then in a position to oppose instructions from his boss in Beijing.
Hu has 17 years before reaching Jiang's retirement age. If he wishes to put his own stamp on China and to preserve the ruling party's influence, he will need to launch bold reforms.
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Hu Jintao
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Anything less than that would only bring about further problems and consequently the loss of credibility.
Hu must remember that the Chinese masses are now much hungrier for the freedom of expression, transparency, and civil society organisations than in 1989.
His predecessors' brutal crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations 15 years ago cannot be repeated now because the price of such an action will be too high and at the expense of the country's economic growth, international position and relations with the free world.
Abdullah Al Madani
GULF-NEWS.COM
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Return of Paternalism
Last week President Vladimir Putin's plan for authoritarian government reform began to take shape. The bill that the Kremlin submitted to the State Duma went further than even the president's original proposals. When Boris Yeltsin similarly announced his intention to introduce special measures for running the country in the spring of 1993, he was forced to back down. After gauging the muted reaction from the public and the political elite, Putin upped the ante.
The apparent indifference to Putin's plan owes in large part to the absence of outlets for the expression of popular opinion. As a recent poll conducted by the Levada Center showed, a majority of Russians oppose the cancellation of direct gubernatorial elections--a remarkable fact given the regime's concerted efforts to undermine the public's faith in elections as an institution.
In essence, the Kremlin's bill would introduce presidential rule. The "election" of regional leaders would in fact amount to little more than the confirmation of the Kremlin's candidates. What's more, the president could appoint regional leaders even without the consent of regional legislatures. If lawmakers reject the president's candidate more than once, he could appoint an acting governor, disband the legislature, or both. Similarly, the Federation Council's power to appoint the prosecutor general in the Yelstin era was in practice little more than a formality.
The plan itself was not made public, but the Kremlin went to great pains to smooth its passage with an impressive PR blitz. Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of presidential administration, made a rare appearance in front of the cameras at a Kremlin news conference. He also stumped for the bill in a lengthy interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda. Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov published an extensive article in Izvestia. And Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov steered a bill through the upper house that puts the finishing touches on the Kremlin's control of the judiciary.
Administration officials now speak of "weak, cookie-cutter political parties" and "faux liberals" who despise their motherland. In their scorn for legislators at all levels and for the expression of popular will, they are merely following Putin's lead. Instead of questioning their own ability to conduct democratic elections, they cast doubt on the public's ability to choose its leaders.
Surkov's argument that canceling single-mandate elections to the Duma would resurrect political opposition is pure demagoguery--as if the Kremlin were concerned about fostering an opposition. Under the existing laws on elections and political parties, the Kremlin already has the power--through its control of the courts, prosecutors and the Central Elections Commission--to bar any party from contesting an election, including the four parties now represented in the Duma. The Kremlin now proposes to serve up dishes to suit every taste--from its own kitchen.
For all intents and purposes, the Kremlin is turning citizens into subjects, robbing them of the right both to form their government and to express their opinions about that government in any form other than offering humble thanks to the president. By weakening democratic institutions and undermining the basis of self-rule, the Kremlin has actively inculcated paternalism in Russian society, even resurrecting the Soviet system of "citizens' appeals."
MOSCOWTIMES.RU
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