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Asia Faces Tough Tasks
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An Indian woman mourns the death of a relative who was killed when a tsunami hit on Sunday, at a burial ground in Cuddalore, 180 km south of the southern Indian city of Madras, Dec. 27. (AFP Photo)
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The location of Sunday's devastating earthquake came as no surprise. Its epicenter lay just off the western tip of Sumatra in one of the most geologically violent regions on the planet, where two of the plates that make up the Earth's surface collide. The tremor, which was the fourth-most-powerful quake in the past hundred years, has killed at least 22,000 people, a number that is likely to be revised sharply upward in the days to come. Hundreds of thousands of people have been left homeless.
Most of the deaths were caused by tsunamis, enormous walls of water generated by the earth's sudden movement and flung outward through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The force of an earthquake in the midst of a land mass is damped by the land itself. But this earthquake's epicenter lay under water, which carries the energy of the quake hundreds of kilometers, until the tsunamis it generates crash onto shore.
Eyewitnesses reported seeing the classic signs of a tsunami just before disaster struck. The water receded abruptly from land and then rose in a 10-meter wall, devastating coasts from Thailand to India and Sri Lanka, which seems to have suffered the worst damage.
The immediate destruction was bad enough. But for at least the next few days the sea will be returning the bodies and the debris it swept away, raising the risk of disease. Finding higher ground may have saved lives in some places, but in many of the islands and low-lying coastal areas, there was no higher ground to seek. The tsunamis are a reminder of how many people in this part of the world live nearly at sea level.
It's instinctive in humans to search for the meaning of an event like this, once shock and grief have begun to subside. And there will be plenty of meanings to find in the ways that humans reacted as this disaster struck and in its aftermath as the relief effort begins. But except for our obligations to help the victims in any way we can, the underlying story of this tragedy is the overpowering mechanics of the Earth's surface, the movement of plates that grind and shift and slide against each other with profound indifference to anything but the pressures that drive them. Whenever those forces punctuate human history, they do so tragically. They demonstrate, geologically speaking, how ephemeral our presence is.
NYTIMES.COM
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Islamic Republic or the Perils of Being Too Powerful
The Middle East is poised at a unique moment in its long and often turbulent history. With the rapid changes in the security structure of the region, all the powers there are cautiously re-assessing their political strengths and weaknesses and re-evaluating their perceptions of threats and challenges.
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Israel are the main regional players and are all reshuffling their cards for different reasons. Israel is trying to maximize its profit from the changing security environment; Egypt is trying to preserve and enhance its role in regional affairs as the traditional leader of the Arab world; Saudi Arabia is exercising damage-control on the impact of the changing world around it; and Syria and Iran are trying to minimize their losses and gain international acceptance and reinstitution as important elements in any future regional security and stability arrangement.
Iran is a unique case among these players due to a number of internal and external factors. These are crucial in its tug of war with its Arab neighbors, Israel and the U.S. Despite violent upheavals, a bloody war with Iraq, internal political tension, power struggles among the ruling elite and external threats and pressure, Iran has managed not only to survive but also to maintain a considerable degree of political stability.
The major events emerging after the end of the cold war have heightened Iran's sense of danger and compounded its threat perceptions. The eight-year war with Iraq, the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S. and its allies, the continuous pressures on Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency to strip it of any potential nuclear capability, the international tolerance and silence over Israel's nuclear arsenal, the adoption of aggressive strategies of pre-emption, are all elements that have heightened Iran's sense of danger.
The alarming deterioration in security in Iraq has made the country both a blessing and a curse for Iran. With the presence of the U.S., Iran is flanked from both sides by a superpower that considers Iran a member of the "axis of evil." On the other hand, Iraq, with its estimated 60 percent Shiite population having strong ties with Iran, could be a trump card for Iran to improve its regional status if it plays its hand smartly. Until now it has: Iran has, at least publicly, maintained a wait-and-see approach, while covertly encouraging Iraqi Shiites to do the same until American intentions regarding the shape of Iraq's political future become clearer.
The mounting resistance against the U.S. has come, until now, from Sunni Arabs who are finding it hard to let go of their historic hold on power in Iraq. This situation presents a serious dilemma for the Americans, as the ascent of Iraqi Shiites to power could create a power structure in Iraq that might adopt Iran's theocratic example if the Americans mess things up.
It is obvious that this scenario, of two powerful neighboring Shiite states, is unacceptable to the U.S. as it moves ahead with its plans to reshape the Middle East. It is also obvious, from a security standpoint, that the U.S. has no intention of allowing Iraq to rebuild its army, at least in the foreseeable future, or of withdrawing. The U.S. intends to maintain a strong military presence in the form of bases that would deter and subtly threaten any state in the region that would contemplate overstepping its role as perceived by the U.S. Such a permanent presence would also serve to free the U.S. from reliance on traditional allies in the Arab world and permit it to freely pursue its agenda of its Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative.
Arab-Iranian ties, meanwhile, can best be described as a love-hate relationship. Iran has a mixed record in terms of Persian Gulf and Arab security. Although Iran no longer seeks to export its religious revolutionary model to neighboring and Arab states, many of its smaller neighbors, particularly those with a partially Shiites population, feel threatened by the sheer size of Iran and its military might. With Iraq out of the game, the American military presence is not only welcomed, but also perceived as a security necessity.
On the other hand, there is a sense of fraternity between Arabs and Iranians, as they share a common history and religion. They also see eye to eye on the oldest and most sensitive conflict in the region, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The only obvious winner of this regional political landscape is Israel.
The fears of Iranian military power have been exaggerated politically by the U.S. and Israel to create demand in the smaller Persian Gulf states for three things: an American military presence, new weapons and a need for a regional security structure or arrangement that includes Israel and external powers, while keeping the balance of power totally in favor of Israel.
This "unbalanced status quo" makes peace in the region totally dependent on Israel's interests and good intentions rather than any systematic guarantees for military stability.
ANTIWAR.COM
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Terror Factor in Malaysia
The post-September 11, 2001, era has largely been kind to Malaysia. Much of this can be traced to how Malaysia responded to allegations immediately after the terrorist attacks in New York and near Washington that Southeast Asia was a hotbed for terrorism. Whereas neighboring Indonesia and the Philippines were censured for their slow response in curbing Islamic extremist elements in their midst, Malaysia swiftly jailed suspected terrorists and closed madrassas (Islamic schools) suspected of preaching hate.
Soon even Washington, which had long frowned on Malaysia for its myriad human-rights abuses, was singing its praises as a no-nonsense, unwavering success in "the war on terror". That bolstered the impression of Malaysia as a moderate and progressive Islamic nation, an image that for the most part has stuck to this day.
But with new allegations by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra that militants involved in a separatist movement in southern Thailand were trained in the jungles of the northern Malaysian state of Kelantan, which borders Thailand, the substance of that reputation is being questioned.
That strikes some as warranted, considering how much the Western-led "war on terror" has incited the ire of the Muslim world. But the Malaysian government won't have it. "I am shocked over such a statement," retorted Malaysian Premier Abdullah Badawi.
"It's very possible terrorists have been trained in Malaysia," said Singapore-based terrorist analyst Rohan Gunaratna. To what extent remains unclear, "but there's been training in the Philippines and Indonesia"--why should the jungles of Malaysia be considered immune? "You can train without the knowledge of governments."
Over the past two decades, Malaysia has arguably fought to protect its national reputation more fiercely than any nation in the region. It has ambitiously promoted a robust image of itself though mega-projects and incessant propagandizing. The country's information minister was quoted as saying in October, "We have not only made Malaysia peaceful, successful and prosperous, but we have also in a very strong way become an inspiration to the whole world." Such whitewashing, standard front-page fare here, has contributed to a culture that is worrisomely averse to criticism and introspection.
All this is not to suggest that Malaysia has become a training ground for terrorists, only that the reality may be more troubling than the government or the rakyat (citizens) are willing to admit.
Malay-Muslims live on both sides of the Thai-Malaysian border. This is not to mention the spread of literature here espousing Saudi Arabia's puritanical interpretation of Islam, known as Wahhabism, or the fact that Islam here is particularly race-based. Almost all Muslims are Malay. Malays are born into Islam. Some fear this may be heightening acuteness to differences and exacerbating the us-versus-them mindset and under-siege mentality gripping much of the Muslim world.
But Dr Joseph Liow Chin Yong of the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore warns against drawing too many conclusions from these developments. He says Abdullah's style is quieter than that of his predecessor Mahathir Mohamad but this does not mean Abdullah has been less than vigilant in weeding out terrorist elements."
Others argue that US President George W Bush's "war on terror" is acting as fodder for extremists and their ideologies, undermining government vigilance and challenging past assumptions about Muslim thinking.
There is debate as to whether the many battles in which Muslims around the world now find themselves embroiled are garnering terrorist sympathy in the region or simply sympathy for Muslim brethren. But for the sake of Malaysia, the Malaysian government would be wise not to jump to conclusions. ATIMES.COM
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Too Safe
Perhaps the most surprising thing about a visit to Bethlehem last Friday, Christmas Eve, was the security arrangements of PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who spent that day in the city. Standing at the entrance to the relatively new Bethlehem Hotel, at which a gathering of Fatah and Tanzim activists in the city was held in the late afternoon, was a lone policeman who absent-mindedly asked a few of those entering the building: Are you here for the meeting? A nod of the head was all it took to enter the third-story ballroom in which hundreds of Fatah activists met the leader of their movement.
In other words, Abu Mazen had no security. Nobody asked the individuals entering the hall who they were or why they were there. There were no gates with metal detectors, no inspection of handbags, no sterile areas--nothing. Abu Mazen, not considered an especially popular figure, and who in his tenure as prime minister complained that threats were being made against him, feels safe enough to go here and there without any security arrangements.
It was his first visit to the city since he was selected as Fatah's candidate for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority, and those gathered in the hall related to the meetings as a traditional expression of confidence in a new Muslim ruler. Abu Mazen repeated his regular speech, in which he mentioned three principles on which the Palestinian movement is founded: an independent state with its capital in Beit-ul-Moqaddas; return to the 1967 borders; and a just solution to the refugee problem (he avoided use of the term "right of return"). The audience showed no signs of enthusiasm.
Here and there, they applauded more out of politeness than anything else, and there were intermittent outbursts from one corner of the hall, along the lines of "Forward, Fatah Youth!" One woman, in rural garb, let loose a traditional ululation of joy, and one of the young people asked Abu Mazen why the Fatah movement was not paying an adequate stipend to the family of a shaheed who had been the commander of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the city, and had died for the homeland.
On the face of it, Abu Mazen didn't have to make much of an effort. His election is assured. His main opponent in the election, Dr. Mustafa Barghouti, trails far behind him in the polls. So are the other candidates, including Bassam Al-Salhi, the representative of the People's party (ranked third in the polls).
Thus, the most serious threat to Abu Mazen is not the other candidates, but the possibility that the public will simply choose not to go to the polls. Why go to the trouble of standing in line when the outcome is clear? In the previous election, held in 1996, it was also plain as day that Yasser Arafat would be elected, but in that election voters were also casting their votes for regional candidates for the legislative council (the parliament), and there a stormy campaign was waged. It is altogether possible that since that time, when those with the right to vote went to the balloting booths to support their parliamentary representatives, didn't mind taking the extra 30 seconds to put in a paper ballot for Arafat. Now Abu Mazen and his aides are afraid that the voters won't even come, and for them, this would be bad news. An especially low voter turnout could be interpreted as a lack of confidence in the new leader, and could harm the legitimacy of his leadership.
HAARETZ.COM
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Milestones for Ukraine
Ukrainian outrage and international monitors helped voters hand Viktor Yushchenko a deserved victory in Sunday's presidential election, a triumph for democracy as well as an individual. But the bitter campaign intensified divisions within the country, presenting the pro-Western Yushchenko with a tough job of reconciliation.
Independent observers and exit polls concluded that Yushchenko won last month's presidential runoff over Viktor Yanukovich, but the government of lame-duck President Leonid D. Kuchma declared Yanukovich the winner. Massive demonstrations in Kiev and protests by the United States and Europe supported Yushchenko's appeal to the Supreme Court, which ruled that officials had padded Yanukovich's vote count. Yuschenko's supporters braved bitter cold and icy streets to support the "orange revolution."
Much of Yushchenko's support comes from the western part of the country, and he has promised closer ties with neighboring Poland and other NATO countries. But eastern Ukraine, where Yanukovich was strong, looks toward Russia, Ukraine's former ruler and the source of much of its fuel. Russian President Vladimir V. Putin supported Yanukovich, campaigned for him and accused Western nations of meddling in Ukrainian affairs when they pointed out the Soviet-style rigging of the election. Yushchenko wisely said his first trip outside the country would be to Moscow. He isn't a stranger there; he was prime minister under Kuchma from 1999 to 2001, before Yanukovich succeeded him.
Ukrainians deserve credit for keeping the protests peaceful. Parliament did its part in easing tensions when it approved a compromise package of laws three weeks ago to strengthen safeguards against election fraud and to weaken presidential powers.
The shooting death on Monday of the country's transportation minister, possibly a suicide, added another bizarre twist to an election campaign already roiled by allegations that Yushchenko was poisoned by the opposition. The best course for the country would be for Kuchma and Yanukovich to urge supporters to accept the results and celebrate them as advances in Ukraine's transition from Soviet satellite to independent democracy. It will require more than one election to achieve that goal, but the independence of the Supreme Court and the acceptance of an honest ballot by Yanukovich's Russia and Ukrainian supporters represent important milestones.
LATIMES.COM
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