Iran’s Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) which was formed in 2000 is based on the necessity of eliminating or reducing costs of public expenditure associated with fluctuating crude oil price in world markets.
Oil price volatility has been a major economic and political concern for many OPEC members.
Repeated cycles of oil boom and bust have played havoc with these countries’ fiscal budget, domestic development efforts and external payment obligations.
Exploring a stabilization machinery has been one of their prime endeavors ever since, reported the Persian daily Donyaye Eqtesad.Ê
Moreover, it is intended to maintain fiscal discipline by uncoupling public spending from oil price volatility to such planned levels of annual government expenditure that would be maintained regardless trend of world oil prices or the size of export revenues.
Lastly, there is the goal of avoiding excessive real appreciation or depreciation of national currency resulting from instability in annual oil exports receipts.
Despite a consensus among development economists regarding benefits of achieving the objectives, no agreement has been reached whether oil fund is the proper instrument to accomplish the task.
Uncertainty revolves around three cogent arguments. Firstly, if the fund is not integrated with the national budget, it might create dual machinery and interfere with sound fiscal management.
Secondly, the fund entails risks of fragmenting asset management and reducing accountability and transparency.
And lastly, they involve the thorny inter-generational issue of transferring funds from a possibly prudent government that currently accumulates wealth to a probable unwise future government that could subsequently misuse the assets.
Iranian economic experts argue that the OSF can succeed when it begins to use the finance as an important axis to realize the objectives of the five-year development plans.
Financial experts also say that the Majlis should devise efficient and comprehensive rules for it, ensuring that they are pursued accordingly by the government and the authority in charge of overseeing the whole process.
It is necessary to specify what the OSF can and cannot do.
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Oil Stabilization Fund
This means yielding the pleasure of spending for the welfare of the present and future generations.
Such funds make important decision for the people ever more transparent and justifiable.
An OSF with a transparent function can reduce public rumors and speculations and win public trust with regard to national wealth.
It can boost the credibility of government. It also allows lawmakers to devise its rules and regulations, while boosting the power of supervision.
Through reports, lawmakers can also oversee the funds’ deposits and withdrawals much more efficiently.
These funds through investment and risk management can create revenues for future generations and boost public welfare.
They can boost the competitive edge of private businesses in international trade. By means of implementing efficient monetary and financial policies they can empower private, industrial, and agricultural and exports sectors.
They can also protect the governments from oil price volatility in the international markets, stabilizing the national economy.
The OSF can be a perfect replacement for monetary policy. Given the governments “seek income“ from sources other than the fund, state debts to the fund will be greatly reduced, thus protecting the nature of the fund which is pure saving for the governments.
This is because administrations borrow from the fund to pay off their debts.
An oil government that fails to control its budget expenditures or devise efficient policies to avoid adverse impacts of oil price volatility, will be unable to establish an efficient OSF.
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Successful Examples
In establishing an oil reserve fund, the goal is to smoothen the pattern of oil-dependent government expenditures, and to escape the so-called “resource curse.“
Article 60 of the Third Five-Year Development Plan (2000-05) called for the establishment, in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), a “crude oil foreign exchange reserve account“ aimed to stabilize the government’s annual budgets during period of the plan.
The main provision of this article emphasizes, all foreign exchange income received from crude oil exports over and above the figure specifically projected in the plan for each year, has to be deposited in that account.
Since the beginning of the plan’s third year, the Treasury could debit from the OSF account if the government’s oil export receipts fell below the budgeted amount for that year.
An amendment to the original plan law in November 2000, stipulated that 50 percent of the fund reserves should be set aside for lending to domestic private entrepreneursÐ in foreign exchange, and at low interest rates for productive investments in the third plan’s priority sectors. The rial proceeds of OSF operations were to be placed in a Rial Reserve Fund for eventual budget deficit financing.
Some main characteristics of a successful OSF in countries which have established it efficiently are as follows:
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A-Operational Aspects
Transparent relations and integrating the fund with government budget, inflexible rules and regulations with an eye on securing the budget, viewing the fund as a pure saving for the government, expenditures that will have to be approved by the parliament, solid and productive monetary policy that can facilitate and help the government in a sudden oil income crunch.
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B-Assets Management
* The CBI or a group of committed and competent managers from the private sector must be in charge of investing the fund’s assets.
* OSF assets must be invested in foreign companies.
* Risk management (including listening to criticisms) on liquidity and assets be calculated and booked meticulously and transparently.Ê
* Supervision of the Majlis and the people over efficient implementation of the investment rules of the OSF in terms of lending and borrowing.
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C-Transparency and Accountability
* Continuous and periodical reports on the OSF operations, assets, allocations and returns to the Majlis and lawmakers, before being approved and announced to the general public.
* Efficient performance of duties and accountability to the general public, as people (the true owners) have a right to know what happens to the OSF and its assets.
* Accurate accounting by independent accountants over the investment assets of the fund.
ÊAn OSF will work best as a stabilizing and balancing force in a country which is fairly rich, politically and economically stable, and enjoys low inflation.
The national budget may alternate between deficit and surplus each year, but it is in balance over time.
The treasury’s credit for borrowing in the world capital markets is fairly high; and foreign exchange surpluses earned during oil booms could be effectively sterilized by the CBI to contain domestic excess liquidity.Ê