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Jonathan Cook
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Hezbollah’s resistance against the aggressions of the Zionist Israeli regime during the 33-day war made hegemonic powers reconsider their Mideast policies. It also inspired resistance movements in the region and across the world to consider Hezbollah as a model.
Israel’s defeat was followed by a wave of criticisms inside the regime, which appointed the Winograd committee to reverse some of the damage to Israel’s military image.
Iran Daily’s Amir Tajik interviewed Jonathan Cook, senior political analyst, to discuss several aspects of the 33-day war and the role of Israel and the US in the Middle East.
A British journalist and writer based in Nazareth in occupied Palestine, Cook has written several books on Middle East issues. Graduated with honors in philosophy and politics from Southampton University, he has a postgraduate diploma in journalism from Cardiff University and a Master’s in Middle Eastern studies. Excerpts:
AMIR TAJIK: You have declared that Israel’s attack on Lebanon’s Hezbollah was based on a prepared script. Which countries do you think contributed to this script?
JONATHAN COOK: I don’t think there is too much doubt about who was involved in writing this script. It was a cabal inside the Israeli and US political and security establishments. My guess is that the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, was only marginally in the picture. There is a common misperception in the West that Israel is not only a democracy but that it is a normal regime in terms of its political structure. What isn’t appreciated is that the army and government are more like two ’faces’ of the same set of institutions, which is why the same personnel move so effortlessly between them. In the most important areas of life, the army is really in charge of the country.
We have quite a lot of evidence for how the script was drafted, a process that I describe in detail in my forthcoming book, Israel and the Clash of Civilizations.
According to reports in the US media, for more than a year before the war on Lebanon, Israeli commanders had been discussing an attack on Lebanon with the Pentagon, which at the time was decisively under the control of an ultra-hawkish group known as the neocons--American policymakers with close ideological ties to the Israeli right. It seems that both the US and Israel were agreed that they needed to find a pretext to attack Lebanon.
Why attack Lebanon?
I think we can safely guess that the point was to prepare the ground for a military attack on Iran. Back in 2004, Israeli generals had warned that an attack on Iran would prompt intense rocket fire from Hezbollah over the northern border, so both the US and Israel agreed that Hezbollah had to be dealt with first. There is nothing worse for an army than fighting on several fronts at the same time. Crushing Hezbollah and Syria was therefore seen as the first stage before a strike against Iran. Israel’s failure to deal with Hezbollah’s rockets has thrown the whole plan off kilter. That is why we are seeing a lack of policy direction in both Washington and Tel Aviv. Now they genuinely are at a loss at what to do next.
Were the Qana attack and demolition of the UN building part of this script?
That’s too cynical, I think. Certainly Qana was an entirely predictable outcome of Israel’s over-reliance on airpower when it realized it could not launch a ground invasion of Lebanon without a major loss of its soldiers’ lives. In fact, a former head of Military Intelligence, Uri Saguy, who was one of Ehud Olmert’s informal advisers during the war, told the Israeli media recently that he had warned there would be another Qana.
As for the attack on the UN building, that still needs explaining by Israel. My suspicion is that it was a consequence of widespread feelings among Israeli soldiers, including commanders, of loathing for anything related to the UN. The UN’s reputation has been blackened in Israel by its long association with helping the Palestinians, particularly in the refugee camps in the occupied territories. Still, I doubt that such malevolence can be attributed to a ’script’ drafted at the political or military level.
Israel didn’t attack non-Muslim districts of Lebanon during the 33-day war. Was it deliberate?
There was a conscious attempt by Israel at the start of its attack on Lebanon to incite a civil war on sectarian lines. This goal was repeatedly voiced by Israeli officials. The point was to get the Christians, Druze and Sunnis to “turn on“ the Shia, and great disappointment was expressed when the opposite happened. Such simplistic assumptions about how Arab society can be manipulated are typical of the Israeli security establishment, which has a history of making profoundly wrong-headed judgments about Arabs and Muslims over many decades. In fact, there is a well-established tradition of high-profile racists heading the Israeli academy and, of course, the political and security establishments. Not surprisingly, Israeli thinking about the “Arab mind“ has now infected much of the American academia and military.
Do you agree that Israel is the Middle East’s US military base?
It is one such base, but there are many other countries in the region that fulfill, or potentially fulfill, a similar role. The intention was clearly to make Iraq another base--that model has been officially proposed by the White House. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has made it plain that US forces will continue with a permanent presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future. For similar reasons, Afghanistan has become another American base. But the US has a footing in many other countries in the region, including Turkey, Jordan, the Persian Gulf states, Central Asia, and so on.
The key difference in the case of Israel is that it is not treated as a military staging post as these other countries are. In fact, the US army is usually loath to be seen relying on Israel in this kind of direct fashion because of the effect it has on feeling in the Arab world. Instead, Israel’s army train and advise the US on how to function and fight in the Middle East, and the two share intelligence. It is an arrangement that is seen as cooperation between equals.
What ambiguities did the Winograd report clarify for both Israel and the US? And what ambiguities did the report itself have?
The Winograd Committee’s purpose was not really about clarifying anything; to do that, the government would have had to set up a much more serious and independent commission of inquiry. Winograd was about apportioning blame in a way that would reverse some of the damage done to Israel’s military image by its failures in Lebanon, and about acting as a safety valve for some of the frustrations of a wider Israeli society that felt betrayed during the war. Once the committee was established, both the prime minister and the Israeli army jointly used Winograd as a way to deflect the harshest criticism away from the army command and towards the civilian leadership.
Real criticism of the army--which it richly deserved--might have further dented what is known here as ’deterrence’, that is, promoting fear among neighboring states that Israel is militarily invincible.
The surprising thing about Winograd report is how little it seems to have discovered about what decisions were taken and why--the real point, one would assume, of holding such an inquiry. For example, Winograd admits being unable to find out how Olmert reached the decision to go to war--in what many officials have noted was “record time“. There are no records of telephone conversations or meetings between Olmert and the then Chief of Staff Dan Halutz. Another reason there may be no official record of this decision-making process is that such a record would embarrassingly reveal that outside actors, namely the Americans, were closely involved.
A core concern in Israel not addressed by Winograd is the fear that the Israeli army’s dismal performance may one day lead the US to reconsider Israel’s role as its pitbull in the Middle East. This underpins a spiritual angst in Israel following the war that has yet to be dispelled.
Why didn’t Arab regimes support Hezbollah during the 33-day war? Wasn’t Hezbollah fighting Israel on behalf of the Arab world?
There are a few obvious reasons for the lack of support. One was that Hezbollah was regarded as a proxy for Iran. The Arab states were not comfortable seeing a Shiite militia, backed by a Shiite, non-Arab state, succeed where they have so consistently failed. Then there was the problem that Hezbollah’s resistance to Israel contrasted with the Arab world’s own lackluster attempts at standing up to Israel. Hezbollah’s popularity inevitably came at the Arab states’ expense, and was presumably seen as having the potential to inflame popular feeling within their own borders to a dangerous degree. And, of course, the Arab states that are usually referred to as ’moderate’ by the West, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have earned that label only because they have been induced to cooperate and collaborate with the West and Israel. It was not, therefore, surprising that they sided with the West against Hezbollah.