As a nonnative speaker of English, I have always been intrigued by the phrase “polar opposites.“ Fact is, nothing so resembles the North Pole as the South Pole. Based on this polar symmetry, there exist the opportunity and an increasingly urgent need to emulate Antarctica and establish an Arctic nuclear-free zone. Such a step would have significant environmental and conservation benefits, while working to avoid conflict and foster scientific cooperation.
The urgency of the need arises from the existing unsatisfactory legal situation on territoriality, military practices and the faster-than-expected rate of Arctic ice cap shrinkage. Global warming is opening up the prospect of navigating the sea surface of the Northwest Passage linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the potential for military clashes.
Recently there has been a flurry of declarations (for example, by Canada), activities (by Russia) and counter-responses from others that use the Arctic perimeter or its waterways for their navies.
Many proposals have been advanced in the past for the creation of nuclear weapons-free zones in central Europe, the Baltics, Middle East, South and East Asia. The only success on paper in the Northern Hemisphere has come for Central Asia, but obstacles remain in the way of its operationalization. By contrast, almost the entire Southern Hemisphere is already covered by such zones: Latin America (1967), the South Pacific (1985), Southeast Asia (1996), Africa (1997), and of course Antarctica (1959).
These are all based on multilaterally negotiated treaties among the countries in the zone and protocols whereby the nuclear powers accept their responsibilities vis a vis the regional zones. The zones were crafted to complete a significant gap in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty whose nonnuclear members were legally permitted to host and base on their soil nuclear weapons owned and operated by foreign allies. All nuclear-free zones prohibit this and so deepen and complement the nonproliferation regime.
The Antarctic Treaty goes much further in freezing in perpetuity conflicting territorial claims, prohibiting any militarization and nuclear activity, protecting the continent’s fragile ecosystem, guaranteeing scientific cooperation, and instituting a complex system of shared regime management that has actually worked wonderfully well.
The motivation behind all such zones is disengagement before the fact: Legal regimes and oversight mechanisms are put in place that prevent disputes and problems from arising in the first place.
In Antarctica, many countries have long-standing claims on pieces of its territory, some of which overlap. Many others could make claims based on various legal grounds, haven’t actually done so, but have not renounced their claims. Many more reject the idea of Antarctic colonization, arguing that its uninhabited status and critical role in the global ecosystem make it a common heritage of mankind.
Several states take part in scientific activities without asserting or rejecting territorial claims.
The Antarctic Treaty “froze“ the territorial status. Claimant and would-be claimant states did not renounce their rights. They agreed not to engage in military activities, although the military forces could take part in exploratory and research activities. They agreed to protect the flora and fauna and to make common decisions with respect to the unknown but potentially vast treasure-trove of minerals, with conservation trumping exploitation.
On Aug. 24, Canada’s Pugwash--the Nobel Peace Prize-winning organization with a proud record of active engagement on nuclear disarmament--called on governments to emulate Antarctica and establish an Arctic nuclear-free zone.
The legal regime on the ownership of Arctic seabed resources and transit rights is ambiguous and incomplete. On one hand, there are conflicting principles based on laws of territoriality, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves and historical practices, as well as the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.
On the other hand, scientists have proven to be overly conservative in estimating the rapidity with which the ice cap is shrinking. Accelerated global warming will enable commercial ship navigation through Arctic waters and permit exploitation of seabed resources. Countries with legal claims and economic resources, the material capacity to exploit them and the military capacity to defend them may not be able to resist the temptation to create new facts on the ground now in order to protect their future interests.
An AFNZ would be an exemplary means of foreclosing competitive militarization--and perhaps even competitive nuclearization--without treading on the existing status of claims over territory, resources and transit rights. It could reverse the disquieting drift to weaponized nuclearization that seems to be occurring in parallel with global warming.
It would reflect, adapt and add to the precedents of all other nuclear-free zones, and to the 1971 Seabed Treaty, which forbids the stationing of nuclear weapons and support facilities on the seabed outside territorial waters.
Some 113 countries are already party to nuclear-free zones around the world. Who will take up the slack in the Arctic to educate all relevant countries about the nature of such a zone, convince them of the merits and universal benefits, and persuade them to negotiate a multilateral treaty to establish it?
Ramesh Thakur
JAPANTIMES.COM

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran addresses the 62nd session of the United Nations General Assembly at the UN in New York, Sept. 25.

The president of Iran, who has made a point of defying the West and Israel, has won admiration even among Sunni nations across Middle East.
The president is a wellspring of stinging sound-bites and swagger for Muslims who complain that their leaders are too beholden to or frightened of the Bush administration.
“I like him a lot,“ said Mahmoud Ali, a medical student in Cairo. “He’s trying to protect himself and his nation from the dangers around him. He makes me feel proud.
He’s a symbol of Islam. He seems the only person capable of taking a stand against Israel and the West. Unfortunately, Egypt has gotten too comfortable with Washington.“
Ahmadinejad’s appeal is especially strong in Egypt, where he is compared to the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose bold, yet doomed vision of pan-Arabism in the 1950s was also aimed at stemming Western influence.
In the minds of many Egyptians, Iran’s quest to expand its nuclear program despite United Nations sanctions is similar to Nasser’s confrontation with the British and French over nationalizing the Suez Canal.
What’s striking in Ahmadinejad’s case, however, is that the leader of a non-Arab Shiite nation has ingratiated himself with the Middle East’s predominantly Sunni Arab population.
In praising the Iranian president, Arabs prefer to speak of how Ahmadinejad is a rallying voice for Islam at a time the region is bewildered by its powerlessness to fix Iraq, Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“He’s a brave man,“ said Tayseer Ibrahim, an employee of the Egyptian Education Ministry, who was hurrying toward the subway the other day. “He’s standing up to the US. He could have been intimidated after what happened to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but he’s not. The Iranian people must love him a lot. Hopefully, our Arab leaders will see that you can defy the West and nothing will happen to you.“
“We are with him as long as he’s against Israel and the US,“ said Munther Farrah, who sells nuts and chocolates in Amman, the Jordanian capital.
The static of threats and counter-threats has enhanced Ahmadinejad’s brand of populism, which stands in vivid contrast to the detached styles of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.
Ahmadinejad’s intense distrust of the US and hatred of Israel have elevated him to mythical status for the frustrated Arab mechanic, taxi driver or lawyer seeking a pure, forceful message.
The sentiment is similar to the respect won by Hezbollah, which fought a war with Israel in 2006, and Hamas, the Palestinian party that seized control of the Gaza Strip in June. Both were credited with tenacity and portrayed as underdogs battling against larger enemies. This type of resolve, along with Iran’s pride as a sovereign state, echoes through Ahmadinejad’s speeches and asides.
“It is more of a scream that reflects the incapacity of both the Arab regimes and Arab peoples to achieve anything on the regional level,“ said Nabil Abdel Fattah, a political analyst with Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.
Ahmed Taher, an Egyptian doctor, credits Ahmadinejad for pursuing nuclear technology, which Tehran says is for civilian use, but the US suspects is for weapons.
“It’s beyond doubt that Ahmadinejad’s popularity surpasses any other leader in the Middle East,“ Taher said. “We shouldn’t blame him for seeking nuclear program. Israel has nuclear arsenal so it will be much more dangerous to the world.“
“He has a sense of belonging to the Muslim world. He always stands by Muslim nations,“ said Hussein Ali, a guide waiting for a bus. “We need his strong Islamic voice to protect us from the West.“
LATIMES.COM

Security has always been a central aspect of European integration. Its goal--to end fratricidal wars and build a stable Europe founded on a democratic peace--has been reached; today it is unthinkable that EU member states should go to war, or even threaten to use force, against each other. But a sustained peace among Europe’s democracies depends on the survival of the EU. And in a context of multiplying post-cold-war threats, the EU is central to the development of common defence.
The EU faces new threats: not only transnational terrorism, but the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. Europe’s response has been slow and falls far short of what is necessary in light of our responsibilities and capabilities. The lack of any real solidarity among member states prevents the EU from responding efficiently to these threats. The absence of a shared Middle East strategy greatly lessens the impact of EU interventions. The slow response to conflicts such as that in Darfur raises questions about Europe’s commitment to humanitarian principles and solidarity in our relations with Africa.There are signs of change, however.
The Balkan wars forced Europeans to think long and hard about our inability to intervene to solve conflicts within our own continent.
This wake-up call bore fruit with the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy in 2000. At the same time, efforts to work with Nato enabled the EU to undertake its first military missions, first in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the intervention depended on EU means alone.
In 2003 the EU approved the European Security Strategy, which identifies the main threats to our common security. This document, which outlined a European view and strategic doctrine for the first time, needs to be updated.
But having a European defence system also means developing military capabilities. We need to strengthen the rapid response capacity to deal with crisis situations. This includes setting up battle groups covering land, air and sea; reinforcing planning and operations management capacities; and establishing a European industrial base, with a central role for the European Defence Agency. All this should complement Nato.
Making European defence a priority is urgent in order to consolidate the Euro-Atlantic security community; to reinforce EU cohesion and its autonomous defence capability; and to respond to external threats and contribute to regional and international stability in the Middle East and Africa.
Portugal is an integral part of European defence. It has been a player from the start, participating in the Common European Security Policy and in all EU military missions, and contributing to the development of European military capabilities.
Portugal’s commitment is being put to the test as it presides over the EU Council in the second half of 2007. We want to reinforce Europe’s capacity to intervene in international crises, and the EU-Nato partnership.
We are committed to strengthening relations between the EU and the UN, not least to address the task of rebuilding war-torn states. We want to broaden strategic and military cooperation between the EU and the African Union to help prevent conflict and ensure the consolidation of Africa’s states. We want to reinforce dialogue with the countries of the southern Mediterranean, which is essential to address shared threats.
Defence is a vital driver of European integration today. The EU must become a true defence community: only then can it become a fully developed international actor.
Nuno Severiano Teixeira
GUARDIAN.CO.UK

Pakistanis have reacted sharply to the Saudi role in the deportation of Nawaz Sharif on September 10. For example, accusing the Saudi government of supporting “a military dictator against the wishes of 160 million Pakistanis“, the APDM warned that, it “will not tolerate Saudi interference in Pakistan’s internal matters“.
It did not restrict its criticism to a mere statement and boycotted the Saudi reception held soon after. Apart from the APDM, religious scholars, khateebs and political commentators also denounced the Saudi role.
The criticism during some of the TV talk shows was so scathing that the Pakistani government had to warn independent channels against airing such criticism failing which, it threatened to take action against them under the PEMRA rules.
Was the criticism against Saudi Arabia justified? How do we explain the proactive role of the Saudis?
It is undeniable that Saudi Arabia is no ordinary friend of Pakistan. It has a special place for Pakistanis because of the location of Islam’s holiest places on its soil, its help at critical junctures in Pakistan’s history and for providing employment to about 1.5 million Pakistanis. The relationship between the two countries is so unique that the Pakistani government or the opposition has from time to time sought Saudi help to sort out political disputes.
This was the case in 1977 during the PNA movement against the government and then again in 2000 following Sharif’s conviction in the plane hijacking case. These examples prove that the Saudis did not involve themselves in Pakistan’s domestic politics uninvited; and that they did so at the request of the parties involved. Hence they cannot be accused of interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.
The “not guilty“ verdict, however, cannot be passed against them in the case of Sharif’s deportation. This is so because as opposed to the past when all the parties in dispute were on board, in the present situation one of the parties, namely Sharif, was not consenting.
The argument that the Saudis had a locus standi in the case by virtue of the “deal“ is inconsequential because for all practical purposes in the absence of Sharif’s consent, the Saudi involvement amounted to interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Incidentally, the “deal“ that provided the pretext for the Saudi interference has no place in the eyes of law because, being a unilateral undertaking, it fails to fulfil the essential condition of an agreement. Nor can international law take cognisance of it because, being at best an agreement between a state and a private citizen, it lacks international character.
It can at the most be described as a “gentleman’s agreement“ with an undoubted moral value but unenforceable under law.
There is another dimension to the Sharif affair that made critics subject the desert kingdom to criticism. It relates to Saudi violation of the order of the Pakistan Supreme Court that had asked the Pakistan government not to prevent Sharif from returning to Pakistan because it was an inalienable right that could not be contracted away.
The Musharraf government shamelessly violated the SC order by abducting and deporting Sharif. The Saudis became an accomplice in this disgraceful transgression when their intelligence chief refused to accept the SC judgment and urged Sharif not to come to Pakistan, in addition to the Saudi king’s reported letter to the Pakistan government asking for Sharif’s return.
The way the Saudis conducted themselves showed that they looked upon Pakistan as their fiefdom.
Why did the Saudis, who are worldly wise and discreet in their dealings, undertake a mission that was utterly impervious to the sensitivities of Pakistanis? The Saudi apologists explain it in terms of the place that a given word has in the Saudi tribal setup and their desire to see to it that the “deal“ they had struck with Sharif was implemented in letter and spirit.
It is true that a given word is sacrosanct in Saudi society but the argument applies to Saudi subjects and cannot be stretched to cover recalcitrant foreigners such as Sharif. The Saudis are clever enough to know this fact yet they ignored it, which signifies that the argument based on the sanctity of a given word does not hold and we need to look elsewhere for an adequate answer.
The Saudi intelligence chief provided the answer to this conundrum during his Islamabad press conference when he justified Sharif’s staying in exile for the sake of the “stability“ of Pakistan. Now what is the meaning of this cryptic remark?
Its significance becomes clear when we view the whole episode in the context of the existential struggle in which Pakistan is at present engaged. The country is threatened by forces of extremism that are increasingly gaining ground and if not checked now could overwhelm it. If that happens, it would be an unmitigated disaster not only for a nuclear Pakistan but also for the region and the world at large.
The House of Saud, already under attack from Al Qaeda that is bent on its elimination, seems to share this threat as testified by its use of the Imam of Kaaba as a trouble-shooter during the Lal Masjid crisis.
DAILYTIMES.COM