Mahmoud Abbas

Momentum seems to be picking up for the November meeting in Annapolis, Maryland, between the United States, Israel, and representatives of roughly half the Palestinians, to achieve a framework agreement for comprehensive peace negotiations, leading to permanent peace.
In many ways we are back to 2000, when Israelis and Palestinians hurriedly huddled with Americans at Camp David to try and resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that is at the heart of Arab-Israeli tensions.
Camp David attempt did not succeed, due to deficiencies on the part of all three of the principal parties. We should avoid a similar rush-job today--driven again by the slightly hysterical urgency of a disheveled American administration nearing the end of its term.
I have some comments for the Palestinians, who are hobbled by three major constraints going into the meeting: President Mahmoud Abbas is dangerously close to being seen by many in the Arab world as a hapless American-Israeli puppet; his political party, Fatah, has been largely discredited as a corrupt, bloated and inefficient burden on society, and no longer represents majority Palestinian thinking; and, the absence of Hamas from the Annapolis meeting makes the Palestinian delegation’s credentials rather thin.
There is one way that Abbas can overcome these constraints, which recalls a major weakness that contributed to the collapse of the Camp David talks in 2000: He should consult widely, deeply and sincerely with ordinary and politically active Palestinians throughout the world, in order to be able to attend the Annapolis talks as a credible representative of the Palestinians.
The hardest issue to resolve is the status and rights of Palestinian refugees, of whom there are now some 4.5 million living outside Palestine (they were 750,000 when they first became refugees in 1948). All other contentious matters--land, sovereignty, recognition, settlements, water, security, Beit-ul-Moqaddas--now appear resolvable, given the years of negotiations that have taken place by the concerned parties.
The refugees issue, however, remains both intractable and existential for both sides.
Abbas fools nobody by going to an American-Israeli-structured peace conference without the essential compensatory credibility to speak in the name of the proven majority of Palestinians everywhere.
Fortunately, he can start this process by reading a fine volume that is easily available to him and to all Palestinian leaders.
In 2005-2006, the Oxford University Palestinian scholar Karma Nabulsi directed a remarkable participatory project that consulted with Palestinians all over the world to hear their views on the issues that concerned them.
The report of the Civitas Project, as it was called, was published last year by Nuffield College, Oxford. It offers powerful insights into a national community of Palestinians scattered all over the world, but also united by many shared sentiments and needs; and, more importantly, by common perceptions of their rights as human beings.
Nabulsi herself points out that despite the very different circumstances of Palestinians around the world, “one can immediately note certain key commonalities in our current Palestinian discourse: the desire for direct elections to the Palestine National Council, for the reactivation and democratic reform of the [Palestinian Liberation Organization] institutions, for the implementation of the Right of Return.“
How these and other desires can be fulfilled will only be known if these positions are channeled into the negotiating process by fortifying and defining the Palestinian negotiators in the first place.
Rami G. Khouri
DAILYSTAR.COM

Contrary to expectations, the political landscape of post-election Ukraine is not likely to be any smoother.
As soon as the votes are counted, Ukraine will have a hard time forming a government. The ruling coalition will not take shape quickly despite the Orange majority’s efforts to unite and put a good face on things.
Given the state of personal relations between Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, and her excessive demands, any alliance they manage to form is bound to be fragile and short-lived and, most probably, will not make Ukraine any more tranquil.
At the same time, there is a good chance that the Orange leaders will fail to strike a deal and that a future government will represent the same powerful economic and political forces as the former coalition did before the Rada’s dissolution.
Apart from the Party of Regions, the future coalition could include the Communists and the Socialists if they manage to overcome the 3% threshold.
But these two scenarios are not exhaustive. Coalitions may take many and varied forms, even ones incredible to the mind of any sensible analyst. In Kiev non-stop talks are going on between all parties.
Allegiances and enmities change in the blink of an eye. The real bone of contention is access to the resources of that rich country. Despite traumatic political upheavals, Ukraine has been doing rather well economically.
The unprecedented success of Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc at the recent elections deserves special mention. It came as a surprise to many people although it has a logical explanation.
The bloc fought a vigorous campaign, with Tymoshenko playing the first fiddle. She viewed these elections as the last and decisive battle. In a way, her bloc had the advantage of not being responsible for Ukraine’s current problems.
Not being associated with either the president or the government, Tymoshenko could lash out with equal ferocity both at Yushchenko and his supporters and Prime Minister Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. It was an effective strategy; her energy helped her attract even hitherto alien voters to her banner, and won over some of Yanukovich’s fans.
Regrettably, the Party of Regions failed to carry out some of the promises it made during the previous election, such as to upgrade the status of the Russian language and to hold a referendum on Ukraine’s entry to NATO.
The leaders of the party and the government often applied double standards to key issues, losing the support of their voters as a result. For part of Ukrainian society, Tymoshenko has appeared to be more outspoken and appealing for that reason.
The results of the current elections are bound to affect Russian-Ukrainian relations. If Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense and Tymoshenko’s bloc form an Orange coalition, it will be more difficult for Russia to conduct dialogue and have normal cooperation with Ukraine than it was when it was under the Party of Regions and their allies.
It is too risky to make any forecasts before the final results are announced, but whatever happens Russia should develop bilateral relations with Ukraine, or at least maintain the status quo.
Being Ukraine’s next-door neighbor, we are linked by tremendous economic interests. Nonetheless, we may have to face many complicated problems.
On the one hand, we cannot be indifferent to what is taking place in Ukraine, on the other we should not interfere in its internal affairs.
To maintain a proper balance, we should try to preserve good neighborly relations and partnership with Ukraine, and keep it away from NATO.
Ukraine’s entry into this alliance would have grievous consequences for our two nations.
The parliamentary race in Ukraine is over. Could our own political elite derive any lessons from it on the eve of the approaching elections to the State Duma? The situation in Russia is very different in many respects--the political system, functioning of parties and conduct of voters. In this sense, it is hard to draw any parallels with the Ukrainian campaign.
Yet, strange though it may seem, the Ukrainian Orange forces are similar to the most radical Russian parties in their approach to political problems.
en.rian.ru

It is too early to tell whether South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun can call his trip to North Korea last week a success, but North Korean leader Kim Jong Il must be happy with the visit.
The summit choreography appeared to confirm his status as the senior leader on the Korean Peninsula, and the summit declaration gave him virtually everything that was on his pre-visit wish list.
More important is the Korean public’s reaction: If Mr. Roh gets a bump in the polls and boosts the prospects of the progressive candidate in the December presidential ballot, then both men will be able to call the summit a success.
But the real measure of success is follow-through on its terms.
The meeting of the two Korean heads of state was only the second in history. Mr. Kim Dae Jung first made the trek north to Pyongyang in 2000, a visit that was heralded at the time as inaugurating a new era on the Korean Peninsula.
But tears of joy gave way to anger when it was revealed that Mr. Kim had paid hundreds of millions of dollars for the privilege. Opinions hardened when North Korea’s Mr. Kim refused to travel south as promised to return the visit--“the time was never right“--and Pyongyang continued to exploit South Korean generosity.
A one-sided rapprochement alienated many in the South, although true believers have not wavered in their faith.
Mr. Roh continued the policy of engagement and extended it, pushing for still more aid and deeper economic integration, symbolized by the Kaesong Industrial Zone. His popularity has sunk, however, as Seoul’s overtures seemed increasingly disconnected from reality and the North rebuffed calls for reform and reciprocity.
The president had hoped that another summit would restore his standing and boost his party’s prospects in the upcoming December election.
The visit started with flowers and floral rhetoric, then proceeded downhill. Mr. Roh was met in Pyongyang by Mr. Kim Yong Nam, No. 2 in North Korea, and they drove together to meet Mr. Kim Jong Il, a symbolic association of the two men as subordinate to Mr. Kim.
The image was confirmed when Mr. Roh had to walk all the way to Mr. Kim, who stood unmoving and unsmiling. This contrasted with the greeting given to Mr. Kim Dae Jung when he visited in 2000.
By the second day, the atmosphere had warmed, with Mr. Kim offering to extend the meeting an extra day, an offer Mr. Roh declined.
Nonetheless, by the time of Mr. Roh’s departure, the two leaders had released an eight-point statement in which they “agreed to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.“
This includes working toward a permanent peace treaty to replace the Korean War’s 1953 armistice, promoting and expanding economic cooperation, providing special treatment and privileges for cross-border cooperative projects, expanding the Kaesong Industrial Zone, and creating a joint fishery zone in the West Sea, among other items.
In addition, the two men pledged to hold regular summits, have their defense ministers meet in the near future and their prime ministers meet in Seoul in November, and expand the reunions of separated families.
Especially important, the two leaders promised to implement agreements reached in the six-party talks to solve “the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula“ although the specific word “denuclearization“ was not used.
JAPANTIMES.COM.JP

There is, conveniently, no official count. But there are an estimated 160,000 private contractors working in Iraq, and some 50,000 of them are “private security“ operatives--that is, fighters.
The dangers of this privatized approach to war became frighteningly clear last month, after guards from Blackwater USA, assigned to protect American diplomats, were accused of killing at least eight Iraqis, including an infant.
Iraqis, whose hearts and minds the Bush administration insists it is finally winning, were infuriated by the killings, telling tales of arrogant and trigger-happy operatives terrorizing ordinary citizens.
The incident provides an irrefutable argument for bringing these mission-critical jobs, which should be performed by soldiers, back into government hands as quickly as possible, and for placing any remaining private contractors under the jurisdiction of US military law.
Blackwater’s 850 operatives in Iraq are not the only problem. The fact that American diplomatic activity in Iraq nearly came to a halt when Blackwater was grounded for a few days shows how much US operations have come to depend on mercenaries.
The armed forces have relied on private contractors since the United States opted for an all-volunteer military after the end of the Vietnam War- mostly for noncritical tasks such as building or cooking.
The Bush administration took it to a whole new level when it decided to fight a big war with a far too small force--requiring the Pentagon and other agencies to turn to private security contractors like Blackwater to help make up some of the difference.
Contractors have been in a legal limbo in Iraq since 2004, when US authorities there granted them immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. Some of the interrogators involved in the abuse of prisoners at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison were private contractors, yet none of them have been punished. Indeed, no private contractor has been prosecuted or convicted for any crime involving an Iraqi victim.
In November 2006, an amendment was included in the defense authorization bill that put private contractors under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, exposing the contractors to a court martial just like any other American soldiers. The Bush administration has been none too eager to enforce this new law, and the Pentagon has not yet issued guidelines to commanders about its application.
The lesson here is that such essential jobs cannot be outsourced. War is not a private business.
HERALDTRIBUNE.COM

Following the success of their 2006 spring offensive, the Taliban were expected to make even further gains in Afghanistan this year. It never happened, due to strong pre-emptive action by Western coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani military action against Taliban bases in the Pakistani tribal areas.
However, plans for a mass uprising on the back of renewed insurgency activity are far from shelved, and could be implemented with vigor at the end of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan next week, with tens of thousands of freshly trained men pouring into Afghanistan.
The key lies in Pakistan’s tribal areas, from where the Taliban draw recruits, have training camps and run their logistics.
The Pakistani Taliban and Islamabad signed peace agreements in February 2005 and September 2006, under the terms of which the Pakistani Army cut back its troop levels in the tribal areas in return for militants stopping their attacks on the Pakistani Army and forces in Afghanistan.
In July the Taliban abandoned the treaties following the storming of the radical Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad by government troops. The mosque was an outspoken supporter of the Taliban movement and many militants used it as a sanctuary.
Since then, the Pakistani military has re-engaged militants in the tribal areas, severely choking their supply arteries.
In the past 10 days, however, militants have launched at least nine carefully planned operations against security positions in both North Waziristan and South Waziristan, and in towns in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), including Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and in the Swat Valley.
As a result, all security operations against the Taliban and their al-Qaeda colleagues in the tribal areas have stopped, and by all accounts the army is running scared. It is estimated that Pakistan has 100,000 troops and 1,000 military posts along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
From the military’s perspective, the situation is exacerbated by a political hiatus in Islamabad. President General Pervez Musharraf stands for re-election in Saturday’s presidential polls, after which he is expected to step down as military head and prepare over the next few months for a civilian consensus government, most likely with former premier Benazir Bhutto. No new plans to tackle the problems in the tribal areas can be expected until this situation is settled.
The Taliban and their supporters now have the breathing space to replenish stocks and prepare for their new push into Afghanistan. It is envisaged that at least 20,000 fully trained fresh men from at least 16 entry points along the Durand Line that separates Pakistan and Afghanistan will be sent into Afghanistan.
According to people who spoke to Asia Times Online and who are familiar with the planning, the main points will be Noshki (in Balochistan province), Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan), Angur Ada (South Waziristan), Shawal (North Waziristan), and Chitral and Bajuar agencies.
The new forces will go to the front lines in Afghanistan in the southeastern provinces of Ghazni, Khost, Gardez, Paktia and Paktika, and many of them will be trained suicide bombers.
The action has already picked up in Ghazni. On Wednesday (Oct. 3), hundreds of Taliban occupied the remote district of Ajristan, killing at least two policemen and forcing the rest to flee. The Taliban have occupied numerous other remote areas. Wednesday’s attack came a day after a suicide attack on a police bus in the capital, Kabul, killed 13 people.
The strategy to attack the Pakistani Army is being orchestrated by a cabal of former army officers who have joined up with the militants in Waziristan. They draw inspiration from the guerrilla strategy used by Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap against the French and the Americans. Given the backoff by the Pakistani military, their plans are working, at least for now.
ATIMES.COM