The news last month that Pakistan is likely to get French air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and radar for its JF-17 fighter aircraft has raised some eyebrows in the US.
The reason is that MICA AAMs produced by MBDA and RC-400 multimission radar built by Thales may enrich China’s rapidly growing military capabilities if sold to Pakistan, since Islamabad is developing its fighter plane jointly with Beijing. The JF-17 is a lightweight multi-role fighter co-developed by Pakistan
Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation under a joint venture of China and Pakistan.
Thus, some observers say, the widely debated European Union arm systems ban against China may finally be circumvented, in such a way that it could damage US efforts to keep Beijing’s air power at disadvantage vis-a-vis Taiwan. As some Indian and Pakistani sources have pointed out, French-built Mirage fighters owned by Taiwan are actually equipped with such missiles and radar.
Taiwan and India are obviously concerned with China’s military build-up. If China gets the chance to closely look at French advanced technology in possession of Taipei, Beijing could theoretically become capable of countering it effectively.
However, it must be noted that the issue of military technology transfer is fairly complicated, and that Pakistan’s acquisition of French systems is not automatically a dramatic reinforcement of Chinese capabilities, unlike some reports suggest.
In fact, if French companies sell radar and missiles to Pakistan, they don’t sell the know-how necessary to build such systems from scratch. Clearly, bits of the source code needed to integrate the components into the JF-17 will be transferred by the French to the Pakistanis. Missile-radar integration and avionics will be developed by France and Pakistan, with the Chinese contribution focused on hardware.
This means that if Pakistan transfers such code to Beijing, China could actually become capable of integrating the two systems into its fighter jets (like the J-10), although it will not include the JF-17 in its air force. But it does not mean that Beijing will be able to produce such systems.
Therefore, the key variable here is how many MICAs and RC-400s France sells to Pakistan. Of course, if Islamabad buys new series of them after the first acquisition, it is conceivable that China could get its hand on them in the future, independently of the JF-17 development.

Rumors of the Deal
It is certainly no secret that France has eyed Indian and Pakistani defense markets as a great opportunity to expand its strong military-industrial sector. For years, French companies have provided weapons and systems to both Delhi and Islamabad. However, the deal regarding the JF-17 has been a difficult one, mainly for political-diplomatic reasons. This explains the lack of information from France and the extreme cautiousness in all aspects of the current arrangements.
After some leading British and US publications highlighted the danger of sensitive military technology transfer to China via Pakistan, officials from MBDA and Thales refused to comment on the deal. France’s Defense Minister Herve Morin subtly conveyed the Paris position nonetheless, as he replied to Associated Press journalists that “to my knowledge, there is no arms embargo for Pakistan“.
Back in September 2004, Jane’s Defence Weekly’s special correspondent Robert Sae-Liu reported that the choice of a multimode pulse-Doppler radar for the JF-17 fighter was reported in 2003 as “involving a competition between Phazotron of Russia with the Kopyo system, Galileo (FIAR) of Italy with the Grifo S-7, and Thales of France with the RC 400“.
Hence, a short history of the JF-17 project unveils Thales’ interest. The simple fact that two French companies are involved in the issue worries the US. Paris has long lobbied within the EU for lifting of the arms embargo against Beijing imposed by Europe after the 1989 Tienanmen incident.
Most French Gaullists and Socialists have pushed for a lifting of the ban. The reason is twofold. On one hand, the French defense industry is aggressively seeking expansion in Asia’s markets, and China is arguably the most interesting of them. On the other hand, Paris cultivates the geopolitical ambition of creating a multipolar world in which the EU will progressively acquire strategic autonomy from the United States.
ATIMES.COM

Nursultan Nazarbayev

Vladimir Putin

The three post-Soviet summits that Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, hosted this past weekend - of the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)--were a kind of review of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, a balancing of the achievements and blunders of his CIS policy over two terms in office.
The three international groups clearly outline the future the CIS is headed for. The Commonwealth is turning into a level-arm balance with two “centers of gravity,“--Russia and Kazakhstan, the two economic giants of the former Soviet Union. Other CIS members tend to gravitate toward one end or the other, forming economic and political alliances with various degrees of integration. Its structure is flexible, because both Russia and Kazakhstan have their own friends and foes among the former Soviet republics. Moscow sometimes succeeds in doing what Astana fails to achieve, and vice-versa.
The group’s structure is also flexible, because both Russia and Kazakhstan have their own interests, which sometimes clash. The two nations have learned to accept this as reality by now. Russia does not want to supply its energy resources to one market, and Kazakhstan is pursuing a similar policy.
Russia is diversifying its export pipeline routes, and eventually Kazakhstan will start doing so too. But this does not prevent them from being close economic, political and military partners, both between each other and with other CIS nations.
It was no accident that of all the former Soviet republics, Russia and Kazakhstan were the ones to tap into a new style of bilateral relations, different from that which existed in the Soviet Union, and worked it out by trial and error. Belarus could well be in Kazakhstan’s place, paired with, say, Ukraine, because Russia did not necessarily have to play the consolidating role.
On the contrary, had Moscow been more aggressive in the 1990s, had it tried to recreate the U.S.S.R. under an “alternative EU“ brand, it would have scared away the others with this move back into the past.
It was certainly the Kremlin’s best idea under Vladimir Putin’s presidency to start complaining, some three years ago, that the CIS was cumbersome, ineffective and tailored in the fashion of the Soviet Union.
Simultaneously, Moscow began abandoning subsidized oil and gas shipments, the key instrument holding the CIS together. Both Russia and Kazakhstan are now viewing oil and gas as merchandise, rather than an instrument of political pressure.
This change has accelerated the reform of the CIS, and, more importantly, the development of new policies by its members. It was time to stop holding on to the past and start building the future.
The triple summit in Dushanbe was largely successful. Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus established a common customs zone, a solid foundation for a Eurasian economic union.
On the other hand, President Putin’s last post-Soviet summit suggested several simple albeit important conclusions. First of all, Moscow will not be able to make use of political blunders made by the United States or European Union forever.
It is certainly true that the West used to pursue too aggressive a policy toward the former Soviet countries in a bid to draw them as far from Moscow as possible.
Finally, there is one simple and natural thing Russia needs to do now - forget where the Soviet Union’s borders used to be. The Russian term “near abroad“ is no longer synonymous with the former Soviet Union. It has gradually come to include China, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, which are important targets of Russia’s eastern policies.
Moscow and its CIS partners are equally new to the current system of geopolitical relations, which replaced the one that was in place, say, 20 years ago. In any case, there will be no return to the past for them.
en.rian.ru

Report of the European scrutiny committee of the commons on the new reform treaty is a serious document. It does not call for a referendum. It makes clear that thanks to the negotiations over the new treaty Britain will have a new relationship with Europe.
It does not enter into the percentage game. The new treaty is 44,000 words long. The dead constitution was 157,000 words long. Unless there is a new EU mathematic directive abolishing the laws of percentages 44,000 cannot be 90, or 95 or even 50% of 157,000.
Key elements of the old constitution remain. There will be a standing president of the EU Council.
The commission and the parliament opposed this idea when it was first put forward because it strengthens the inter-governmental nature of the EU. The new treaty says there should be EU foreign policy voice under control of 27 national foreign ministers.
Last week, William Hague was calling for tough European action on Burma. I agree. Yet the same William Hague wants to kill the treaty that might make this possible. He also wants referendums on any new treaty.
This is what Turkeyphobes argue for. They want national referendums to stop Turkey joining the EU. It is sad to see the Conservatives now joining those who argue for referendums on future Turkish membership.
Is the new treaty the old constitution? It is difficult to see how this can be intellectually defended. The new treaty leaves all the old treaties in place.
The constitution abolished all the old treaties and rolled them into one giant EU document. The new treaty gives more powers to Parliaments to stop EU directive than was on offer in the constitution.
The scrutiny committee wants more powers for parliament. So do I. But if every EU national parliament wants a veto right on any EU directive then we might as well as all go home. British rights under EU treaties to travel, live, trade, and work freely will always fall foul of national protectionist instincts. Some like Bill Cash will argue that is a price worth paying. Reading the full report of the committee, it is Mr Cash who is the driving Tory spirit on it.
Treaty opponents never tell us exactly what they don’t like. The Tory-UKIP position is just to say no to Europe. The scrutiny committee rightly complains that in Britain we do not, whether in parliament or in the wider political context, debate and discuss Europe with adequate time. I agree.
We have tried. In the last parliament we set up a special standing committee of parliament to discuss the negotiations on the constitution. Not once did a Tory front bencher attend. The Tories are disingenuous on Europe. Hague is calling for endless referendums because he wants to undermine Gordon Brown’s principled decision that parliament, not the press or a plebiscite should decide our international treaty obligations.
The scrutiny committee report is an important contribution to parliamentary debate. It should be read carefully. I do not agree with all its conclusions. Its main one is that there is not enough information on Europe. The scrutiny committee argues that the timetable on the current treaty negotiations is too compressed. In essence this debate has been going on since 2002. Whether members of the scrutiny committee can persuade fellow MPs to give the parliamentary time remains an open question.
I have attended nearly every Commons debate on Europe. I have helped take two treaty bills - on Amsterdam and Nice--onto the statute books.
William Hague in common with John Redwood who said the Amsterdam treaty would mean “the abolition of Britain“ is great at getting anti-EU quotes into the Daily Mail.
But turn up for lengthy, technical EU debates? No, that would mean confronting counter arguments.
There is one odd argument in the scrutiny committee report. The new treaty calls for parliaments to take an active part in revising treaties and to so help make Europe work better. I read this as meaning more resources and possibilities for MPs to act politically in European matters. So as an MP I welcome this.
The committee thinks it is a power grab by Brussels over national parliaments. It is a genuine matter of debate.
Making Europe more political, more parliamentary, and more democratic remains a top priority. The scrutiny committee has done a good job even if its conclusions do not flow from its arguments.
Denis MacShane
guardian.co.uk

Demonstrators protest against torture in Los Angeles, Dec. 10.

Critics cheered when the Bush administration did an about-face and disavowed torture as a government-sanctioned policy.
In 2004, the Justice Department repudiated the infamous torture memos written after 9/11, and the president declared: ’’The United States does not torture.’’ Bush even signed a bill whose authors believed would outlaw torture. It turns out, however, that there was nothing to cheer about.
Reports now indicate that while the administration was paying lip service to the idea of abiding by anti-torture statutes, it was doing something else behind the scenes.
First, it jettisoned officials in the Department of Justice who didn’t agree with it. Then the administration welcomed a new lawyer to head the Office of Legal Counsel, Steven G. Bradbury, who was happy to comply with the wishes of his superiors.
Under the tenure of former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Bradbury wrote two new secret memos that gave superiors what they wanted--a way around the law.
It came down to clever semantics and a predisposition to ignore congressional restrictions on executive power. The 2005 Detainee Treatment Act championed by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., outlawed ’’cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment’’ of prisoners in US custody anywhere in the world.
Never mind, said Bradbury. His opinion explicitly condoned some of the harshest tactics that the CIA used--including waterboarding, head-slapping, frigid temperatures and ’’combined effects’’ using several practices simultaneously. His rationale reached back to a Supreme Court finding that only conduct that ’’shocks the conscience’’ is unconstitutional.
We guess it all depends on whose conscience we are talking about. Clearly, for some members of the administration like Vice President Cheney, hardly any tactic is beyond approval if it might elicit information from detainees.
Earlier this year, the vice president said dunking prisoners in water is a “no-brainer.“
The administration says that torture pits the rights of suspected terrorists against the right of the public to be safe and secure. It’s not that easy.
Whether we torture is about what kind of nation we aspire to be, and whether we are willing to abide by internationally recognized standards of civilized behavior.
Congress rightly has opted for the higher standard, but to no avail. Given the president’s penchant for ’’signing statements’’ that undermine the very laws he signs, this is not the first time he has appeared to thwart the will of Congress. After six years of this type of behavior, such acts of bad faith still shock the conscience.
MIAMIHERALD.COM