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Duff Diplomacy
Condoleezza Rice keeps pretty chirpy, but it was a gloomy weekend for US power and interests in the Middle East.
Every way she looked during a flying visit to the region, hopes of progress turned to dust in her hands. From Pakistan to the occupied Palestinian territories, there is a sense of imminent unravelling born of misjudgment and long-term neglect.
President-General Pervez Musharraf’s “second coup“ was a personal rebuff for the US secretary of state. Whatever his other failings, the crisply-pressed Pakistani leader is a gentleman of the English colonial school. But good manners did not prevent him rejecting Ms Rice’s latest calls for restraint--and then ignoring her frantic telephone calls.
Gen Musharraf’s calculation that the White House and Pentagon will tacitly go along with his putsch is probably correct in the short term. As always his fealty, however conditional, to the “global war on terror“ comes first. Ms Rice is reduced to hoping the emergency measures will be short-lived and elections will still go ahead soon.
But US and Pakistani analysts suggest the democracy-security trade-off that has kept Gen Musharraf in power since 9/11 cannot be sustained for much longer. If prolonged civil strife ensues, as some predict, the Bush administration and its British sidekicks will be blamed for not doing more, earlier, to encourage consensual, peaceful reform while it was still attainable.
Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, her power-sharing plans disrupted, may now be obliged to campaign all-out against the military regime.
The ensuing confrontation could be unpredictable and bloody both for her and the general. From the US point of view, various unfolding scenarios, including Gen Musharraf’s fall, point towards the same uncomfortable question: who lost Pakistan?
Ms Rice’s weekend firefighting expedition to Istanbul was similarly uninspired. The part aim was to furnish Turkey with a good, publicly acceptable reason not to invade northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdistan Workers party (PKK) militants--something Ankara has been demanding from Washington for at least two years.
The talks preceded today’s “showdown“ meeting--as Turkish media portray it--between Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and President Bush in Washington.
In the event Ms Rice appears to have tabled little of substance beyond enhanced intelligence-sharing. Asked what, if any, effective action was planned, including mooted US military moves against the PKK, she neatly explained Washington’s dilemma while avoiding giving an answer.
“Effective action means you’re actually trying to deal with the infrastructure of terrorism. But you want to do this in a way that doesn’t compromise our other major goal, a unified, secure and stable Iraq,“ Ms Rice said. That suggested little would change. The Turks were predictably unimpressed--and may take matters into their own hands. “It has been a meeting with no resolution,“ a Turkish diplomat said. “There have been no tangible steps offered to us.“
Ms Rice’s Israel stop-over was unproductive, too, casting further doubt on the usefulness of the US-promoted peace conference, vaguely scheduled for Annapolis, Maryland, either this month or next.
Ms Rice said the parties--principally, Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas--were still working on “ideas“. No agreement has been reached, no final document has been completed and no invitations have yet been issued. Discouraged by this last-minute scramble and lack of a substantive agenda, leading Arab states such as Saudi Arabia warn they may not attend.
“I suspect this will not be the last effort that I will have to make to prepare the meeting ... this is a very delicate time,“ said a cheerful Ms Rice, whose frequent flier miles are beginning to rival Warren Christopher. “They [the parties] are coming to the realisation ... that Annapolis is an event but it’s not the only event. There has to be a day after.“
This rather obvious effort to downplay expectations suggested the Bush administration, after largely ignoring the Palestinian issue for six years, was losing confidence in its own project.
As if this display of duff diplomacy were not enough, Ms Rice also found time for a row with Walid al-Moallem, Syria’s foreign minister, on the Istanbul sidelines. The US, she said, would not tolerate outside interference in Lebanon’s delayed presidential election.
Neither would Syria, Mr al-Moallem waspishly retorted. “Condoleezza Rice speaks about Lebanon as if it is an American state,“ said Syria’s state-run Tishrin newspaper.
Virtually lost amid all the blather and blunder was the original purpose of Ms Rice’s visit: a discussion with Iraq’s neighbours on how best to support Baghdad’s weak, divided but ostensibly democratic government.
GUARDIAN.CO.UK
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French Kidnapping
In Chad
By Hassan Najar
The kidnapping of children in Chad by machinations of a so-called French non-governmental humanitarian society called L’Arche de Zoe or Zoe’s Arc is the focus of global mass media attention, particularly the French-language media in Africa as well as outside the continent.
The controversial intervention of French President Nicolas Sarkozy in the case has added new dimensions to the abduction which, all angles considered, can help theoreticians assume new postulates and also shed some light on the ambiguities.
The main perpetrators have been arrested and Chadian courts are looking into the charges, but the case still has many implications. There two versions at stake. One being the official side of the story and the other the version which contains several ambiguities and questions about the entire ordeal.
Official report says that the charity workers of Zoe’s Arc, on the grounds of rescuing wounded and sick children in East Chad, tried to transfer 103 children to France for being adopted by French foster parents. However, in the middle of the operation Chadian security officials discovered that the children are all in good health and actually have families and shelter. Thus, the idea of kidnapping came to the fore. Those responsible for the abduction were arrested and put on trial in Chad. Amidst all the mess, Sarkozy arrives in Chad to discuss the case with Chadian President Idriss Deby. He manages to secure the freedom of some of the arrested people, mainly the journalists accompanying Zoe’s Arc and the crew members of a Spanish charter company, and takes them to France. In the meantime, interrogation of other suspects has begun while the incident is denounced by various governments, including the delayed condemnation of the 27-member European Union.
It seems that Zoe’s Arc, which works in Chad under the name of Children Rescue, has been active in the country for quite some time. With the cooperation of a Belgian pilot, the children were flown from the so-called crisis zone in eastern Chad, which borders Darfur, Sudan, to another city in Chad three times a week under the pretext of a better life and medical care. The charity workers constantly used air services of the French military stationed in the volatile region, but somehow they were turned in! A conscious mind is to assume that an illegal network has been engaged in the affair the range of activities of which transcends Chadian and Sudanese territories.
Surprisingly enough, after the abduction was unveiled, one of the journalists accompanying Zoe’s Arc airs a flaky program on several TV channels which shows how the children are bleeding and have wounds in their hands and heads. When it became clear that the children are all healthy and when their parents said that they never received any money and gave their children to the French charity workers in hope of education and better living conditions, the case became even more intricate. What was the objective of the TV program? If journalists were really accomplices of the charity group then why were they released following the intervention of the highest French official? Did the TV program merely aim at somehow showing that the conditions in Darfur were critical? Was it just propaganda warfare to facilitate the presence of more military forces, in the guise of peace-keepers, in Sudan?
It is also said that another objective of the kidnapping was to steal the children’s body parts and also for sextual abuse. How can it be that the French wanted to take the children to France and provide them with shelter while their country is grappling with an army of illegal immigrants?
Although some sections of the mass media have tried to portray that Sarkozy’s sudden presence in Chad stems from his morale that he always wishes to see himself on top of global developments, it is said that his younger brother Fran¨ois is one of the main financial sponsors of Zoe’s Arc. This in itself implies that the French president was fully aware of the charity’s activities beforehand and that he also benefits financially from its activities. In any event, the ambiance is reminiscent of 40 years ago when any crisis in the French African colonies was resolved in meetings between French and African officials.
All in all, the entire truth still remains untold. Perhaps the case will find new facets with the psychological warfare typically expected from western sections of mass media, no matter how many people have lost trust in non-governmental organizations functioning as charity and humanitarian entities.
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Precariously Perched
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An ancient cistern in Iran's historical city of Yazd.
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If General Pervez Musharraf is trying to ensure the stability of Pakistan, he certainly has an odd way of going about it. His promulgation of a Provisional Constitutional Order 2007 (PCO) and a State of Emergency over the weekend have upset the delicate political transition needed by the country amidst the return of Benazir Bhutto and the planning for elections three months hence.
To make matters worse, the subsequent arrests of largely peaceful moderate politicians, a purge of the judiciary and gagging of the press have alienated the very forces of moderation and democracy Pakistan needs the most right now.
As a result, Pakistanis now find themselves living in the sort of repressive state they have not experienced since the 1980s, during the rule of the last full-fledged military dictator, General Zia-ul Haq. All private news channels were taken off the air and new laws were unfurled to restrict fundamental rights, silence the media and impose punishments of up to three years for criticising the military.
The regime has used its new powers under the provisional emergency to flush the Supreme Court and the high courts of all “hostile judges“ and rope in pliant replacements.
The PCO lies at the crux of this political turbulence. It is unconstitutional because it suspends part of the constitution without parliamentary approval.
It lays the political system at General Musharraf’s mercy and whim. The contents of the emergency which follows on the basis of the PCO shed a great deal of light on why he has taken this drastic step.
In General Musharraf’s telling, his prime motivation is deteriorating law and order amid acts of terrorism.
He has accused the judiciary of being a major culprit in log-jamming the executive and undermining the war against extremism. Out of 11 effective clauses in the proclamation of emergency, eight refer to the negative role played by the judges and the judiciary in challenging the military’s use of force in the war against terrorism, the executive functioning of government, and the economy.
The most significant clauses in the PCO prohibit the courts from challenging the president, prime minister or anyone exercising authority on their behalf.
But the reality may be somewhat different from the law-and-order rhetoric. General Musharraf was faced with a challenge to his recent re-election as president before the Supreme Court, turning on whether he could hold the post of president while still in uniform at the head of the army. Such a challenge is now disallowed under the PCO.
And because General Musharraf is also purging the judiciary of judges who will not swear to uphold the new constitutional order, he can be sure the courts won’t complain about the new restrictions on their powers.
Gen. Musharraf has sworn in a new chief justice and a few dozen other judges, and has detained the judges who have been removed.
It is also noteworthy that under the new legal regime, Gen. Musharraf can extend the term of the various parliaments for up to a year. Their terms had been scheduled to end later this month, and general elections should have followed within three months.
But thanks to the declaration of emergency, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz now says that elections can be postponed. This makes perfect political sense for Gen. Musharraf. Given widespread public resentment against him, his ruling Pakistan Muslim League had been fearful of its chances at the polls and was pressing the president to postpone them.
Ms Bhutto has described the emergency declaration as a “mini martial law“ or “second coup“ by General Musharraf, who first acceded to power in a coup in 1999. General Musharraf’s presidency, which was likely to be struck down by the old Supreme Court, has been confirmed and upheld by the new PCO.
DAILYTIMES.COM.PK
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Thailand’s Pre-Election Jostling
Thailand is scheduled to hold a general election on December 23rd, and the country’s political scene is heating up as political parties jostle for position ahead of the polls.
Having been under the control of a military-appointed government since last year’s coup, Thailand could have a democratically elected government in place by early 2008. However, even if this occurs a swift return to political stability is unlikely.
The installation of an elected government could help to end the country’s recent period of political turmoil.
However, such a benign outcome is by no means assured. Voting patterns in the recent referendum on the new constitution highlighted still deep and potentially disruptive divisions within society.
Tension emanating from such divisions will inevitably build in the pre-election period.
Even assuming that the election goes ahead as scheduled and without any major disruption, the ensuing balance of political power is likely to create difficulties.
The political scene is set to return to the era of weak coalition governments comprised of unruly factions that neither last a full term nor provide policy continuity and effectiveness.
The People’s Power Party (PPP) will be a potent force in the election--it has in effect become the successor of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, now that many former TRT members of parliament (MPs) have joined it. Although the TRT’s founder, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in the coup in September 2006, is set to remain in exile at least until after the election, his tacit backing of the PPP ensures that it will fare well in the north and the populous north-east, where he remains popular.
The PPP will also have a proven policy agenda as a selling point--its policy foundation is likely to be similar to that of the TRT when Thaksin was in office.
The PPP may therefore be capable of mustering sufficient support in the new 480-member lower house to lead a coalition government after the election.
Opposing the PPP in the election will be the Democrat Party (DP), which could emerge with a large number of MPs, owing to its support in the south and from the middle class in the capital, Bangkok.
However, the DP still appears to be out of touch with Thailand’s grassroots, and this undermines its potential to garner an overwhelming victory in the election.
Other than the PPP and the DP, there will be a clutch of smaller parties contesting the election.
Their alignments have become fluid as the election has approached. Amid talk of mergers and alliances, a host of parties, some of which are breakaway factions of the TRT, are all currently battling for recognition as the leading “third choice“, but few offer any genuine alternative policy platforms to either the PPP or the DP.
If these minor parties do pick up votes, it will be because of the personalities of their leaders, many of whom are veteran politicians.
It is unlikely that the small parties will win sufficient seats to lead a coalition government, but they will play a major role in enabling either of the two main parties to build one.
Although the Council for National Security (CNS, the military body that launched the September 2006 coup) has pledged to ensure that the election will be free and fair, it is likely that it will attempt to keep Thaksin and his supporters out and will be in favour of a coalition government that excludes the PPP. Indeed, in late October the PPP leader, Samak Sundaravej, accused the military of having plans in place to denigrate him and stir up resistance to the return of a TRT clique.
ECONOMIST.COM
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