United States of America

Deeply frustrated by the George W. Bush administration’s policies, many people and governments in Europe hope for a fundamental change in American foreign policy after the upcoming presidential election.
But it would take a medium-sized political miracle for these hopes not to be disappointed and such a miracle will not happen--whoever is elected.
The Bush administration made numerous foreign policy blunders with far-reaching consequences. But Bush neither invented American unilateralism nor triggered the transatlantic rift between the United States and Europe.
To be sure, Bush reinforced both trends, but their real causes lie in objective historical factors, namely America’s being the sole world power since 1989 and Europe’s self-inflicted weakness.
As long as America remains the sole world power, the next US president will be neither able nor willing to change the basic framework of America’s foreign policy.
It will of course be important who wins the presidency: a candidate expected to continue Bush’s foreign policy or someone ready for a new beginning. In the former case, the transatlantic rift will deepen dramatically. Four, or even eight, more years of US policy in the style of Bush would inflict damage on the substance of the transatlantic alliance such as to threaten its very existence.
But if America’s next president is committed to a new direction, US foreign policy might again become more multilateral, more focused on international institutions and alliances and willing to bring the relationship between military force and diplomacy back to within its historical proportions. That is the good news.
The bad news is that even under such auspicious conditions the US as a world power will not relinquish its “free-hand“ policy or forget its strength and its claim to preeminence among nations.
Another piece of bad (or good?) news is that a more multilateral American policy will increase the pressure on Europeans to take on more responsibility for international crisis management and conflict resolution--in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, Transcaucasia and Russia--and with respect to Turkey’s future. To this common agenda, the Europeans should add Africa, climate change and reform of the United Nations and the world trading system.
For a long time, Europe has underestimated its weight and importance. Europe’s geopolitical, economic and social weight is quite obvious. But Europe’s integration of sovereign states’ interests by means of common institutions could also be an example for much of the world.
In particular, the way Europe, in the process of its enlargement, has projected its power to achieve lasting peace across the whole continent and fostered development by integrating entire economies, states and societies within its institutional framework could become a model for shaping a cooperative world order in the 21st century.
This modern, progressive and peaceful model is unique and superior to all other currently available approaches to the fundamental questions of political order.
But could doesn’t mean will. Europe’s global influence is feeble because of its internal quarrels and lack of unity, which render the European Union weak and limit its ability to act. Objectively strong, subjectively infirm--that is how the EU’s present condition can be described.
The current moment of American weakness coincides with a substantially changed international political environment, defined largely by the limits of US power, Europe’s ineffectiveness and the emergence of new global giants like China and India.
In light of these developments, does it still make sense to speak of “the West?“ I believe it does more than ever, because the rift between Europe and America leaves both sides substantially weaker in global terms.
The unilateral overstretching of American power offers a chance for a new beginning in US-European relations. America, more than in the past, will depend on strong partners and will seek such partnerships.
So what are the Europeans waiting for? Why not start now to overcome the traditional tension between NATO and the EU--especially as French policy toward NATO under President Nicolas Sarkozy has been moving in the right direction? A regular mutual presence of the NATIO secretary-general and of the head of EU foreign policy in the councils of both organizations doesn’t require much time or effort.
Why not initiate EU-US consultations at a high political level (with the NATO secretary-general)--for instance, by inviting the US secretary of state and other members of the administration, such as the Treasury secretary or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator, to sit several times a year on the appropriate EU Council meetings? Why not have routine annual meetings between the European Council and the US president?
Periodic meetings between the appropriate committees of the US Congress and the European Parliament would also be of great importance, as ultimately both bodies will have to ratify any international treaties. The fate of the Kyoto Protocol should be a lesson to all parties involved. No such US-EU consultations would require any new agreements, so they could start without any further preliminaries.
There is one certainty that Europeans can take home from the US election campaign even today: With a more multilaterally oriented US foreign policy, Europe won’t be riding comfortably in the US world-political slipstream much longer.
And that is a good thing. The new transatlantic formula must have greater say in decision-making in exchange for a greater share of responsibility.
TODAYSZAMAN.COM

The picture shows Kurdistan Workers' Party fighters training at the Mahsun Korkmaz Academy in the Amedia area in Northern Iraq, 10 km from the border with the Turkish border.

Turkey has invaded northern Iraq, the domain of the Kurdistan Workers Party, several times. Five years ago I was in the area where fighting is now taking place. At that time small Turkish groups used to cross the border to deliver strikes on Kurdish positions. What has changed since then?
Kurdish separatists are now fighting in the Kurdish areas of Turkey bordering on Iraq. When the Turkish army retaliates, separatists escape into Iraq, where they hide in the mountains, regrouping and rearming for new forays into Turkey. Iraqi Kurdistan is the natural hiding place for Kurdish separatists, and Turkey can do nothing about it.
However, they have killed Turkish soldiers this time, provoking a wave of public indignation in Turkey, and the authorities had to act more resolutely in order not to look like weaklings to their own people.
The Turkish Parliament has decided that the army must take measures to settle the situation and prevent new Kurdish attacks.
The government must now decide if it will sanction a large-scale military operation. So far, Turkey has only been delivering limited strikes, mostly from the air, which is ineffective in the mountains. The Kurds suffered some losses, but only minor ones. Turkey cannot launch a major military operation with the use of tanks at this time of the year--it would be ineffective.
In fact, such operations are designed for the domestic population. The government just wants to show the people that it is not sitting on its hands, which seems to be enough for them.
The political aspect of the problem is much more important. A potential Turkish invasion of northern Iraq would have major political complications.
Northern Iraq, also called Iraqi Kurdistan, is actually an independent state where young Kurds do not speak Arabic and where there are very few Arab officials and soldiers. But it is formally part of Iraq, and so a large-scale Turkish invasion would be seen as an attack against a sovereign state that is a member of the United Nations.
One of Turkey’s aspirations is to join the European Union, but there are numerous obstacles in its way. The opponents of the idea, including French President Nicolas Sarkozy, will use the situation as a pretext for denying access to the EU for such an aggressive state.
Relations with the United States are another crucial aspect. Turkey is a NATO member and Washington’s main ally in the region. But Iraqi Kurds are one of the few U.S. allies in Iraq, especially after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Even when the Americans leave Iraq, which is bound to happen sooner or later, Iraqi Kurdistan will remain an American bridgehead in the country. Therefore, Washington would not do anything that might incite the wrath of Iraqi Kurds.
This has placed the United States between a rock and a hard place, with two of its regional allies ready to start a war against each other. Turkey seems to be more important to the United States, but the Iraqi Kurds would appeal to Washington for help in the case of a war with Turkey.
Kurds are courageous and selfless warriors who resisted Saddam Hussein for decades. They would rally to repel Turkey, but they will nevertheless need outside assistance. In this case, they will appeal not to the Iraqi government, which seems unable to deal with its own rebels, but to the United States.
It is impossible to imagine Washington sending its troops to fight its ally, Turkey, in Kurdistan. Therefore, the United States must prevent a serious conflict in the region, and Turkey will most likely listen to its recommendation.
Suppose 100,000 Turkish servicemen invaded and occupied northern Iraq. What next? How long would Turkey be able to occupy part of a foreign state? It will be unable to eliminate all guerrillas in the mountains. Moreover, Iraqi Kurds might join the guerrillas in case of a large-scale Turkish operation.
True, they do not like Turkish Kurds, saying that they stage provocations that might eventually lead to a war with Turkey. Iraqi Kurds do not want this war, because they earn a lot from trade with Turkey. But the idea of a united Kurdish nation is still alive in their hearts.
The Iraqi Kurds leaders have said more than once that they would not secede from Iraq but only need broad autonomy. They actually have it, and if they decide to set up their own state, they would be isolated internationally. No country would recognize such a Kurdish state, and economic ties with Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran would be severed, pushing Kurds into an economic abyss.
In short, a war against Turkey is the last thing Iraqi Kurds want. Turkey does not need a war either, but it cannot sit on its hands and so is delivering pinpoint strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. And this is all it will do in the next few months.
Georgy Mirsky
UPI.COM

Will Spain hold together, or will separatist tendencies gradually cause its structure to loosen until some regions finally secede?
More than half a millennium after Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella laid the foundation for the political unification of Spain, the question remains on top of the political agenda.
Spain is known for the Basque separatist group ETA, which has killed more than 800 people in its four-decade campaign for the northern Basque region and neighbouring Navarre to merge with a part of southern France in a new state.
The Basque nationalist movement is, however, much wider than the violent and marginalized ETA. Separatist currents are growing stronger also in the bigger northeastern Catalonia, and even in Galicia in the northwest.
The roots of separatism lie in Spain’s linguistic, geophysical and historical variety.
The country’s 2.1 million Basques have their own language, unrelated to any other in the world. Catalonia, with 6.8 million residents, and Galicia, with about 3 million, have Romance languages related to Spanish.
Dictator Francisco Franco, who ruled from 1939 to 1975, tried to suffocate any separatist potential with an iron fist. His policies, such as a partial ban on regional languages, sparked counter-reactions including the birth of ETA.
Democratic governments that followed Franco resorted to the “soft“ method of granting regions significant measures of autonomy.
Spain is today divided into 17 regions with varying degrees of self-government, with the Basques and Catalans even having their own police forces. Catalonia is promoting its language so strongly that some Spanish-speakers feel discriminated against.
The attempt to dilute separatist tendencies by recognizing regional identities has, however, backfired, some analysts believe.
The autonomy system “has not helped to reduce centrifugal dynamics, but rather the contrary,“ political scientist Ignacio Sotelo said.
The system has encouraged even regions which did not traditionally have clearly distinct identities, such as Andalusia or the Balearic Islands, to seek more autonomy, analysts argue.
At the same time, however, migratory movements within Spain have increased ethnic and linguistic homogeneity. In the Basque region, for instance, an estimated 40 per cent of the population does not have a single Basque parent.
Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero’s Socialist government tried to solve the huge problem that ETA represents for Spain, attempting to launch peace talks with the group, but failed like previous governments had done.
ETA sees no chance for peace as long as Spain refuses to put the question of independence on the table, and ended its 14-month ceasefire in June 2007. It has since then killed two police officers in southern France.
ETA and its banned political wing Batasuna are, however, only the extreme expression of a Basque nationalist movement which also comprises more moderate parties, such as regional Prime Minister Juan Jose Ibarretxe’s Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).
Ibarretxe believes that the only way to solve the problem of ETA is to stage a referendum on future options including independence, a plan that the Spanish government is prepared to block in court if necessary.
Meanwhile in Catalonia, the separatist party ERC has been in the regional government since 2003, and the larger moderate nationalist formation CiU has also grown bolder in demanding more autonomy.
Separatism is rising to one of the top themes in the March 9 elections, with the opposition conservatives accusing Zapatero of having encouraged it by negotiating with ETA and by granting several regions more self-government.
At the same time, however, separatism may not be as big a threat for Spain’s unity as the opposition and related media make it seem.
DPA.DE